abstract: At least since Burnyeat’s “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” one of the most ments?3 Does Aristotle think that punishments have a positive role in the. M. F. Burnyeat, Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ‘Virtues in action’ and ‘Aristotle on learning to be good’, is not wholly. Chapter aristotle on learning to be good university. Amelie rorty ed, essays on aristotle s ethics created date. Burnyeat dialectic, to counteract the excessive.
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Haines – – Utilitas 22 2: This entry has no external links. View freely available titles: So learners do not learn that virtuous acts are pleasant by performing and enjoying them, because learners do not enjoy them.
Here “the incurably bad” are the vicious and the brutish; “those who have been well advanced by the formation of habits” include the generous-minded, and “those who disobey and are of inferior nature” are the many. Robert Heinaman – aristohle Phronesis 52 2: Mixed Results for Virtue Ethics. That is why the vicious are incorrigible b They lack the right passions.
Second, motivated by shame, they gain knowledge of which acts are virtuous, becoming incontinent.
Aristotle on learning to be good
The assumption that virtuous acts are like games begs the question of whether habitual virtuous action enables people to enjoy virtuous acts.
There is no reason to think that we acquire these characteristics in the same way at the same time. Thus the enjoyment does not produce, but rather presupposes, the choice.
Ethics in Value Theory, Miscellaneous.
Myles F. Burnyeat, Aristotle on learning to be good – PhilPapers
Presumably, the continent make moral progress by similarly acquiring habits of virtuous passion. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless. In this way no generous-minded person gains the knowledge of which acts are virtuous. Making virtuous acts goodd requires something over and above the skills provided by practice.
Third, the continent have habits of virtuous action, but not habits of virtuous passion. There is hope for the many, however. The vicious have wicked habits of action and passion.
Somewhat speculatively, I attributed a series of stages of moral development to Aristotle. And to internalize the knowledge is to come to choose virtuous acts for their own sake, to deliberately desire virtuous acts because they are intrinsically valuable. Aristotle denies that liberal people find liberal acts e.
Sherman, The Fabric of Character Oxford: Learners will not find all or even most virtuous acts arstotle be pleasant because virtuous acts are not typically pleasant even for the virtuouslet alone for the learners.
However, virtuous acts are not like games in the crucial respect.
Book titles OR Journal titles. Instead, moral development proceeds in several stages beginning with two types of people seldom included in lists of Aristotle’s character types: Objections to Burnyeat’s account I must disagree with Burnyeat for several reasons.
They choose virtuous actions for their own sake and they have knowledge of which acts are virtuous, but they are somehow deflected from performing virtuous acts because they lack virtuous passions. Of course, a firm character includes not onn habits of virtuous action, but also habits of virtuous passion. Learners find some vicious acts pleasant, and some virtuous acts unpleasant.
Instead, “the many think [happiness] is some plain and obvious thing like pleasure, wealth, or honor” a He does say that painful things “will not be painful when they have become customary” bbut “not painful” does not mean “pleasant”. Second, the incontinent choose virtuous acts for their own sake, but they do not perform virtuous acts. The learner enjoys the virtuous act, “because it is what is truly or by nature pleasant.
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